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: This paper presents, in a more general setting, a simple
approach to ‘relevant restricted generalizations’ advanced in previ-
ous work. After reviewing some desiderata for restricted general-
izations, I present the target route towards achieving the desider-
ata. An objection to the approach, due to David Ripley, is pre-
sented, followed by three brief replies, one from a dialetheic per-
spective and the others more general.
This paper presents, in a more general setting, a simple approach to ‘rele-
vant restricted generalizations’ advanced in [2, Ch. 5]. The paper presupposes
familiarity with standard issues of restricted generalizations in relevant-logic
settings [7, 9], and in particular with the issues as framed in [3] with special
attention on applications to robustly contraction-free theories [12].1 Brief dis-
cussion of target application-based issues is given in §1.2, but fuller and more
leisurely discussion is confined to cited works.
An objection to  [2] by Vann McGee (in correspondence) occasioned the idea in this
paper. The paper itself emerged in the very productive atmosphere of 4 (the 4th World
Congress of Paraconsistency), and I’m grateful to Graham Priest for discussion, and particularly
grateful to Greg Restall, who noticed, over dinner, a simplification of the ideas I was thinking
about. I’m also very grateful to Dave Ripley, who raised the objection discussed in this paper,
and who continues to be a lively and valuable philosophical interlocutor, and to Aaron Cotnoir
and Michael Hughes for useful discussion. Finally, were it not for the very interesting ideas that
Richard S. Anderson has recently had on the topic, this paper would not be what it is.
1One assumption throughout is that restricted generalizations involve a conditional. This
is not an uncontroversial (or nonstandard) assumption. For other approaches, see Butchart
[5], Belnap [4], Slaney [13, 14] and references therein. I should note that issues concerning
contraction, contraposition, and so on (see §1) emerge even if the current assumption about a
conditional is rejected; the problems simply take a slightly different—conditional-free—form.
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The paper is structured as follows. §1 presents the desiderata advanced
in [3], and §2 presents the target route towards achieving the desiderata. An
objection, due to David Ripley, is presented in §3. §4 offers three brief replies
to the Ripley objection, one from a dialetheic perspective and the others more
general. §5 offers a few closing remarks.
1  
Let 7! be our target restricted conditional and ! our given (detachable) rele-
vant conditional.2 The desiderata, put forth in [3], are as follows (keeping to
the given numbering).3
1.1 , - 
Some general desiderata are as follows.
1. α,α 7! β ` β (Detachment).
2. β ` α 7! β (Conditional Weakening).
3. α! β ` α 7! β.
6. ` α∧ β 7! α (Conditional Simplification).
Note that [3] doesn’t list 6, but it—like Conditional Identity (viz., ` α 7! α)—
is a desideratum, at least if, as I presume, we want it to be logically true that
(e.g.) all black cats are black and so on.
1.2 -, - 
Some less general desiderata are as follows.
1. α 7! β 0 ¬β 7! ¬α (No Contraposition).
2. α 7! (α 7! β) 0 α 7! β (No Contraction).
2! More generally: robustly contraction-free in Restall’s sense [12].
These desiderata emerge from target applications of the given logics, and in
particular target ‘semantic’ theories as in [10] and [2].4 Such theories have
the resources to form Curry sentences, and so—given other logical features
of the theories—the theories must remain ‘robustly contraction-free’ on pain
of triviality. This motivates 2. Desideratum 1, in turn, is driven by target
2The assumption of detachability, made throughout, is rule detachability: α,α! β ` β.
3I focus only on the - and -level desiderata listed in [3] that involve the target conditional.
(Also: I herein skip the -level desiderata, all of which—I think (though have not proved)—are
achievable on this approach (given suitable choices of quantifiers).)
4And see [6]. In roughly the same family, though not paraconsistent, is Field’s recent trans-
parent truth theory [8].
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‘glutty’ theories: theories containing α and ¬α for some α. In such theories we
cannot non-trivially add a conditional ) that satisfies what might be called the
evil trinity:
• α,α) β ` β (Detachment).
• β ` α) β (Conditional Weakening).
• α) β ` ¬β) ¬α (Contraposition).
Suppose that we add ) to a glutty (and otherwise non-trivial) theory in the
ballpark (e.g., B-ish theories), and let β be a glut. By Conditional Weakening,
β gives us α ) β. By Contraposition, we have ¬β ) ¬α. But β is a glut, and
so we have ¬β, which, in concert with ¬β ) ¬α, yields ¬α via Detachment.
And this is for all α, and so we have near-enough triviality: ¬α for all α. (If, as
many of the target theories enjoy, we have ¬¬α ` α, then we have triviality full
stop.)
Of course, if one’s application(s) of a given relevant logic are different from
dialetheic or, more generally, robustly-contraction-free-demanding applications,
then the -level desiderata mightn’t be pressing. Still, the general -level desider-
ata are likely of interest.
2 :  
Various proposals have been made towards achieving the given desiderata. For
example, in [3], the Routley–Meyer ternary semantics (or simplified versions
thereof ) for one’s given relevant conditional is assumed, and a new conditional
is (semantically) defined via restrictions on the broader ternary relation. In [2,
Ch. 5], an unsatisfiable sentence ? is invoked to define a candidate restricted
conditional (among other discussed options). More famously, the Ackermann
constant t, axiomatized via α a` t ! α, is invoked to define a candidate re-
stricted conditional (viz., α∧ t ! β).5 And there are other proposals.
I leave the details, virtues and potential vices of such proposals to debate.
Moreover, whether such proposals are needed in addition to the following pro-
posal I also leave for debate. What is notable—and my chief aim here to note—
is that, at least in many target logics, one needn’t introduce further machinery
to achieve the -level (or, if one wants, the -level) desiderata. One already has
a candidate restricted conditional. In particular, where ∨ is disjunction, define
α 7! β := (α! β)∨ β
Assuming that disjunction and one’s given relevant conditional (the arrow) be-
have properly, our restricted conditional, so defined, immediately delivers the
given desiderata.
5Priest [10] endorses this sort of approach. For a non-triviality proof of adding the two-way
axiom α a` t ! α to truth theory , see [2, Ch. 5].
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2.1 - 
Details of particular logics are required for proofs, but ‘semantic’ considera-
tions for B-vicinity logics point in the right direction.
• On 1: suppose that ! Detaches and that α is true (in a suitable model).
Then—assuming standard disjunction features—any model in which β is
untrue is one in which (α! β)∨ β is untrue. So, 7! itself Detaches.
• On 6: suppose that ! Conditionally Simplifies, that is, that α∧β! α
is true in all models. Then—assuming standard disjunction features—
every model is one in which (α ∧ β ! α) ∨ α, and hence α ∧ β 7! α, is
true in all models. So, 7! itself Conditionally Simplifies.
Moreover, as is plain, we immediately get 2 and 3 if we have Addition (after
which the ‘simple addition’ proposal is named): α ` α∨ β and β ` α∨ β.
• On 2: Addition gives us β ` (α! β)∨ β.
• On 3: Addition gives us (α! β) ` (α! β)∨ β.
2.2 - 
Whether we have the -level desiderata turns on our given relevant conditional
in terms of which our restricted conditional is defined. As in §2.1, genuine
proofs require details of the particular logics or model theory, but rough, ‘se-
mantic’ considerations point in the right direction.
• On 1: there are two cases, one in which the background conditional
contraposes (as in BX) and one in which it doesn’t.
Where ! contraposes: take a model in which α ! β (and, hence, its
contraposition) is untrue. Any such model in which β is true but ¬α un-
true is a countermodel to Contraposition for our restricted conditional;
such a model is one in which (α ! β) ∨ β is true but (¬β ! ¬α) ∨ ¬α
untrue. (There are such models in the B-vicinity contraction-free logics.)
Where ! fails to contrapose: there are models in which α ! β is true
but its contraposition untrue. Any such model in which ¬α is untrue is
a countermodel to Contraposition for our restricted conditional; such a
model is one in which (α ! β)∨ β is true but (¬β ! ¬α)∨ ¬α untrue.
(There are such models in the B-vicinity contraction-free logics.)
• On 2: consider any model that invalidates Contraction for the back-
ground relevant conditional—that is, a model in which α ! (α ! β) is
true but α ! β untrue. Any such model in which β is untrue is a coun-
termodel to Contraction for our restricted conditional. So, 2 holds.
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• On 2!: whether we have robust freedom from contraction depends on
the resources of the background logic (or target theory). Of course, if we
have a non-triviality proof—as we do in some of the B-vicinity theories—
we thereby have a proof of robust freedom.6
What the foregoing indicates is that, given an appropriate background
logic (and many of the relevant logics are appropriate in the target sense), we
need not look further for an A-level restricted conditional (or B-level if we have
it). We have such a conditional.
3  
According to David Ripley (correspondence), the foregoing proposal faces a
problem. In short, there are models in which, intuitively, all As are Bs, but our
restricted conditional is untrue in such models.
To make the point, we simplify by focusing on a standard, B-vicinity ‘worlds’
model in which all worlds are perfectly classical.7 For purposes of the example,
we step up to the predicate-cum-quantifier level (with which level familiarity is
assumed).8 Here, @ is the base world, in terms of which truth in a model is de-
fined, and I is the interpretation function. The essential features of the model
are as follows.
• Let W = {@, w} = N.
• Let the domain be {a, b, c}.
• Let I@(α(x)) = {b} and I@(β(x)) = {a, b}.
• Let Iw(α(x)) = {c} and Iw(β(x)) = ;.
The objection is that, intuitively, all As are Bs (at the actual world), since, at
the actual world (viz., @), we have it that, for target sentences, I@(α(x)) 
I@(β(x)). On the other hand, the generalization using the proposed restricted
conditional, namely,
8x(α(x) 7! β(x))
is not true at the actual world. In particular, the c-instance of α(x) 7! β(x) is
untrue at @. After all, β(c) is not true at @. Moreover, since there’s a point w
at which α(c) is true but β(c) untrue, α(c)! β(c) is untrue at @ too. Hence,
(α(c)! β(c))∨ β(c)
6Moreover, such a proof would immediately establish freedom from the evil trinity of §1.2.
Hence, e.g., in , where we have a non-triviality proof, we immediately know that since 7!
Detaches and satisfies Conditional Weakening, it thereby doesn’t contrapose.
7Hence, as Ripley (in correspondence) notes, the given model is independent of paraconsis-
tency issues: if it shows a problem with our proposed restricted conditional, it equally shows a
problem with taking (say) the strict hook as a restricted conditional.
8For elementary discussion of these frameworks, see Beall [1], and for broader and more
detailed (though equally user-friendly) discussion see Dunn & Restall [7] or Priest [11].
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is untrue at @. Hence, assuming features of the quantifiers (which features are
not in question here), the proposed restricted conditional fails to get the facts
right—or so the objection goes.
4     
The objection, I think, does not show a defect in the proposal. I give three
replies: two very general (and only sketched), the other peculiar to target di-
aletheic theories (including , which I endorse). I begin with the latter.
4.1   
It is reasonable to expect that a candidate restricted conditional imply its
hook counterpart. Indeed, this might well be made a desideratum—a D-level
desideratum, we might say.
1. α 7! β ` α ﬀ β
That our simple-addition conditional yields 1 may be seen along standard ‘se-
mantic’ lines—for example, simplified semantics for B-vicinity logics. Suppose
that @ 6|= α ﬀ β, in which case @ |= α and @ 6|= ¬α but @ 6|= β. But, then,
@ |= (α ! β) ∨ β only if @ |= α ! β, in which case, because ! detaches,
@ |= β. But this is impossible since @ 6|= β. Hence, there’s no model in which
(α! β)∨β is true and α ﬀ β not. Hence, by definition of our simple-addition
conditional, there’s no model in which α 7! β is true but α ﬀ β not.
On the other hand, the converse of 1, namely,
1. α ﬀ β ` α 7! β
is dubious for various reasons, particularly in a dialetheic context. In standard
dialetheic theories [2, 10], 1 yields triviality if the restricted conditional 7!
detaches. (Proof: let α be a glut, in which case α ﬀ β is true, and so, via 1,
α 7! β is true. But 7! detaches, and so β is true. Triviality.) So, 1 is not an
option for non-trivial dialetheic theories. Hence, in addition to 1, another
D-level desideratum is failure of 1’s converse:
2. α ﬀ β 0 α 7! β
And this brings us back to Ripley’s objection.
4.1.1   
A positive way of seeing Ripley’s ‘objection’ is not so much as an objection as
a concrete confirmation that we have what we want: Ripley’s model is confir-
mation of 2 (i.e., a countermodel to 1). We have @ |= 8x(A(x) ﬀ B(x)) but
@ 6|= 8x(A(x) 7! B(x)). This is good.
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4.1.2   
A negative way of seeing Ripley’s objection is that it simply demands too
much.9 The objection demands a constraint on the truth-at-a-point condi-
tions (the ‘truth conditions’, if you want) of our restricted conditional. The
demand amounts to one of the following constraints, where Iw(E) and I−1w (E)
are, respectively, the extension and antiextension of expression E at point w.
1. w |= 8x(α(x) 7! β(x)) iff Iw(α(x))  Iw(β(x)).
2. w |= 8x(α(x) 7! β(x)) iff y 2 I−1w (α(x)) or y 2 Iw(β(x)) for any y in the
domain.
1 maintains that what’s necessary and sufficient for the truth of a restricted
generalization at a point w is that the extension of α(x) at w be a subset of the
extension of β(x) at w, while 2 invokes the condition that something’s either
in the antiextension of α(x) at w or in the extension of β(x) at w. Without at
least one of 1 and 2, the Ripley objection does not go through. The trouble,
however, is that 1 and 2 demand too much if, as I have assumed, subsets are
understood along a classical (say, ) theory. In short, either condition results
in a contracting conditional, thereby undermining one of the main desiderata.
That a contracting conditional results from 1, where subsethood is un-
derstood along the assumed  lines, may be seen by noting that 1 simply
imposes the logical behaviour of our (classical) subset relation  on the tar-
get restricted conditional. Since the former itself contracts (and detaches) so
too does the latter. So, this demand is too much. (But see §4.2 for further
comment.)
That 2 is equally problematic may be seen by noticing that, at least for
target logics, it requires our restricted conditional to have precisely the truth-
at-a-point conditions that the hook α ﬀ β, defined as ¬α ∨ β, ‘enjoys’.10 But,
then, this will fail to detach in target frameworks (or, in some, contract), and
so fail at least some of the application-driven desiderata.
4.2   
A very brief but more general reply is available.11 Ripley’s objection charges
that from A  B we ought to have a true restricted generalization that all As
9I am grateful to both David Ripley and, in particular, Richard S. Anderson for correspon-
dence that led to a clearer formulation of this section.
10A Routley-Star approach to negation makes the conditions more involved, but the point
goes through for such frameworks.
11In fact, I think that there are quite a few replies that turn on rather big issues concerning
truth, meaning, model theory, and more. (E.g., if, as some deflationists might think, we are using
the model theory as a mere heuristic guide to the logic, or at any rate not taking it to model
‘real truth conditions’, it is not obvious that the objection raises any problems for the logic of
the proposed conditional.) The issues are both interesting and important, but more attention
to them is demanded than I can give in this paper.
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areBs. In turn, the objection highlights cases in which the subset relation holds
but in which ‘All As are Bs’ fails to hold, where the given restricted generaliza-
tion is understood along the proposed simple-addition restricted conditional.
The question to ask is why all As are Bs ought to follow from the corre-
sponding subset claim. The answer, of course, seems obvious: this follows by
definition. And so it does. The question, however, concerns the definition in
question. And this is where the Ripley objection falters. If our set theory is
classical, then we should expect—when talking only about classical sets (say,
the  universe)—that allAs are Bs is a material (i.e., hook) restricted general-
ization that detaches in the given ‘domain’.12 But in this case, there’s no reason
to think that the target B-vicinity theories cannot enjoy as much;13 the target
generalizations simply aren’t the simple-addition generalizations (and needn’t
be, since the hook suffices in the given context). On the other hand, if our
set theory is non-classical, then only details will tell whether Ripley’s objection
gets off the ground. After all, it may well be that, in the non-classical ‘set the-
ory’, the simple-addition conditional is used to define ‘subset’, in which case
the model theory might deliver the results that Ripley’s objection claims are
absent. But, again, only details will tell. Either way, the objection fails to estab-
lish a problem with the simple-addition proposal (at least as one among various
detachable restricted conditionals).
4.3   
One more reply points to an ambiguity in restricted generalizations. In short,
we have two restricted conditionals, one that detaches and one that doesn’t.
In addition to the simple-addition conditional, which I’ve proposed for the
former role, we have the hook: α ﬀ β or, in primitive notation, ¬α ∨ β. This
is not detachable; however, it is true in the sort of models to which Ripley
points. On this reply, what the Ripley objection highlights is that neither of
the two restricted conditionals (the simple-addition and the hook) is in general
adequate for all purposes; however, it may be that for any purpose, one or the
other conditional suits. This is for future work to tell.
5  
Relevant logics, and the theories closed under them, have long faced an issue
concerning restricted generalizations. A recent discussion of the problem is in
[3], wherein one solution is given. This paper reports the good news that, by
using ‘simple addition’, we meet the desiderata laid out in [3], and so achieve
a restricted conditional in a simple, fairly theory-neutral fashion. Moreover,
and more good news, the chief objection to the proposal (viz., Ripley’s objec-
12My ‘domain’ talk is a sloppy way of saying that, in effect, the hook is detachable in the
theory : you won’t find α and α ﬀ β in the given theory without finding β.
13In fact, some of them do [2, 10].
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tion) may be answered along one of various lines. The task now is to push the
proposal further. Such is future work.14
R
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